Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym by Oguri, Junko
The Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 3 Issue 3 
2021 
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym 
Junko Oguri 
Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial 
Management Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Oguri, Junko (2021) "Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym," The Journal of Financial Crises: 
Vol. 3 : Iss. 3, 570-583. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss3/26 
This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and 








Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
November 12, 2021 
Abstract 
Between September and December 1925, the Second Polish Republic faced a so-called 
twin-crisis: the złoty,3 the Polish currency, collapsed, and the financial system faced bank 
runs and flights of deposits. On November 28, 1925, the Polish Government established 
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym (FPIK), injecting over PLN 60 million 
capital through Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a national development bank. The 
government-led capital injection scheme kept supporting the unstable Polish financial 
system during the inter-war period. Furthermore, in the 1930s, the FPIK served not only 
the large banks but also smaller financial institutions, and sometimes, non-financial 
companies. While the FPIK successfully buttressed the financial system, the scheme also 
contributed to the emergence of authoritarian statism, as the state took significant 
centralized control over the economy during the 1930s. 
Keywords: Poland, broad-based, broad-based capital injection, capital injection, 
centralized economy, FPIK, inter-war Europe  
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At a Glance  
The Second Polish Republic (1918-39) 
was established as the Treaty of 
Versailles in June 1919 confirmed 
Poland’s independence. After a period of 
hyper-inflation in 1923, a new currency, 
the złoty, was introduced. The new złoty 
notes were issued as legal tender by a 
newly established central bank, the Bank 
Polski (Smith 1936). In the summer of 
1925, the so-called second inflation 
occurred, and the złoty became unstable. 
Simultaneously, both the real economy 
and the banking system started to 
crumble. Farmer-debtors faced a plunge 
in crop prices and became insolvent. In 
September 1925, the financial system 
started to face bank runs, and 58 percent 
of private banks became insolvent 
(Landau and Morawski 1995).  
On September 4, 1925, the Bank Polski, 
the central bank, lent 15 million złoty to 
the five largest private banks (Bank 
Handlowy in Warsaw, Bank of the Union 
in Poznań, Ziemski Bank Kredytowy in 
Lviv, Bank Zachodni in Warsaw, and 
Bank United Polish Lands in Warsaw), as 
deposits started to flow from Polish 
banks. The loans were secured and paid 
an interest rate of 8% (lower than the 
usual lending rate of 12%) (Stelmach 
2012; Morawski 1996).  
The Bank Polski loans in September 
1925 seemed inadequate to halt the 
panic in the financial system. However, 
given the simultaneous currency instability, the central bank was reluctant to offer any 
further aids, as it considered further funding from the central bank would lead to an 
increase in the money supply and risk further inflation. In other words, the central bank 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To prevent banks from bankruptcy and to 
avoid systemic risk (Morawski 1996, 64-70, 84). 
Launch Dates  November 28. 1925 
Sunset Dates The original sunset date was 
the end of 1927 but was 
later reintroduced in 1931 
(first round) (Stelmach 2012 
66-67; DURP 1925 nr. 119, 
859).  
Program Size PLN 65 million (first round) 
Usage PLN 63.4 million (first 
round, by June 1926) 
Outcomes (i) The state banking sector 
enjoyed much greater public 
confidence, and (ii) the 
improvement in the quality 
of private-sector services, 
forced both by the crisis and 
the recovery programs 
implemented in the banks 
benefiting from the 
assistance of the Credit 
Assistance Fund 
administered by BGK. 
(Wierzbicki n.d.). 
Key Features Multiple means and flexible 
threshold for the 
governmental intervention. 
Eventually, the facility 
evolved as a part of 
“Sanacja” (Sanation), a 
political movement to 
address perceived 
corruption.  
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym 
(FPIK) 
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decided to prioritize its mandate of currency stability over its financial-stability mandate 
(Komierzyńska-Orlińska 2018; Morawski 1996). Thus, the government (led mostly by the 
Ministry of Finance) took steps to protect the banking system (Landau 2007).  
On September 21, 1925, the government established the Komitet Sanacji Banków (the Bank 
Sanation Committee). Given the limited fiscal capacity, the government could only grant 
PLN 25-28 million to the Committee, an amount met by the seigniorage from issuing new 
coins. The Bank Sanation Committee provided PLN 26.9 million to troubled large banks 
(Stelmach 2012; Morawski 1996). On October 13, 1925, the Bank Sanation Committee 
announced that it had completed providing immediate help to the banks and was ready to 
move on to the “second phase.” The second phase implied further structural changes within 
the Polish financial system, including liquidation of branches and potential mergers. As the 
central bank continued to prioritize currency stability, the government was the only actor 
to initiate the second phase (Komierzyńska-Orlińska 2018; Morawski 1996).  
The Bank Sanation Committee was transformed into Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom 
Kredytowym (Credit Institutions Assistance Fund, hereafter FPIK) on November 28, 1925, 
and was mandated to provide assistance to credit institutions and restructure the banking 
system (Landau and Morawski 1995; Wierzbicki, n.d.). The government, initiated by the 
Ministry of Finance, provided PLN 65 million to the FPIK (Landau and Morawski 1995). 
The FPIK injected PLN 63.4 million into 15 financial institutions. The capital was injected 
through Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), a national development bank which was 
created by a merger of three public banks from the Galicia region (Morawski 1996). Bank 
Handlowy SA in Warsaw received the largest injection of PLN 21.7 million, approximately 
one-third of the entire injected capital. Furthermore, as a part of the FPIK, guarantees were 
granted for foreign loans; according to Morawski (1996), the FPIK guaranteed PLN 1.0 
million in foreign loans in 1925 and 0.8 million in 1926. 
On May 17, 1927, the FPIK was terminated as the President of the Republic of Poland 
determined that the financial crisis in 1925 was over and the FPIK had fulfilled its mandate 
(Morawski 1996; DURP 1927 nr. 46). However, as the credit market fluctuated during the 
Great Depression and as the Polish financial system encountered another banking crisis, 
the FPIK was reintroduced. The Act of March 17, 1931, authorized the Minister of the 
Treasury to spend PLN 20 million for bank rehabilitation (DURP 1931 nr. 3). In 1932, FPIK 
was incorporated as a part of new regulation (Morawski 1996; DURP 1932 nr. 94) and 
continued to support the Polish financial system during the inter-war period, with minor 
amendments made in November 1935.  
It is also worth noting that, from its establishment, the FPIK served political means. This 
was particularly true after the May 1926 coup d’états. The FPIK evolved as a part of 
“Sanacja” (“sanation,” or “healing”), a political movement to address perceived corruption, 
and the bill which legally established the FPIK was called the “Sanation bill.” As a result of 
regulation passed in 1932, BGK had new tools including debt relief, debt cancellations, 
guarantees, and capital injections. Following the new rule, FPIK could acquire equity in 
banks and private enterprises. The rule eventually enabled the government’s takeover of 
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targeted troubled institutions (Wierzbicki n.d.; Morawski 1996). For instance, during the 
1930s, some private enterprises and state banks secured debt and capital using FPIK 
despite their apparent difficulties in repayment. These private enterprises were selected 
based on their significance for military, economic, and political reasons. The BGK, the 
conduit of the FPIK, took over those private enterprises under its direct management, 
establishing the so-called “syndicate of the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego,” whose shares 
amounted to PLN 39 million by 1935 and PLN 43.9 million by 1939 (Landau and Morawski 
1995; Wierzbicki, n.d.). Meanwhile, the BGK and other state banks also benefitted from the 
extensive governmental support including through capital and legal privileges, like tax 
deduction (Landau and Morawski 1995). 
Summary Evaluation 
The 1925 capital injection by the FPIK was effective for those large financial institutions 
that could participate in the scheme; however, the scope of the FPIK was limited to large 
banks, as the government faced severe budget constraints. After the revival in 1931, the 
FPIK could inject capital not only to large banks but also to the municipal savings banks 
and cooperative banks (Wierzbicki n.d.). While literature evaluating the capital injection is 
scarce, Morawski (1996) considers the capital injection after the 1930s revival as 
unsuccessful compared to that of 1925 as some participating financial institutions failed 
shortly after the capital injection in 1931. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, some consider the crisis of 1925 and accompanying 
policy responses, including the establishment of FPIK by the government, as having a 
significant impact on the Polish banking system and policies.  
 
First, some authors have criticized the central bank’s passive approach to its financial 
stability mandate and its prioritization of currency stability. This is supposedly because in 
the wake of the hyperinflation of the early 1920s The Bank Polski continued to provide 
banks discounted loans from the late 1920s to 1930s, but only to an extent that would align 
with its interest in currency protection. This can be interpreted as a fair decision, given the 
Bank was only recently created in order to fight against the hyperinflation (Morawski 
1996). 
Second, the government became far more influential in the field of financial stability. For 
instance, in 1926, the government reformed the banking law, established the Banking 
Commissariat (Komisariatu Bankowego) within the Ministry of Finance, and reshaped the 
banking system. In December 1926, the Ministry of Finance rigorously enforced minimum-
share capital requirements and liquidated smaller banks that could not meet the 
requirements. Therefore, the government was committed to enforce hard stances on 
private banks, as it had seen how the collapse of a bank could lead to a systemic crisis, and 
it had spent its limited fiscal budget on the FPIK. The government viewed the fragility 
within the financial system as caused by small and weak banks, which were mainly 
engaged in currency trading activities and not much lending (Landau 2007; Morawski 
1996). Landau and Morawski (1995) note that the credibility of the private banking sector 
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decreased after the crisis in 1925. Consequently, they stated that the “trauma persisted and 
became one of the premises of étatisme4 in banking in the following period,” leading to 
statism in Poland.  
During the crisis in 1925, foreign investors took advantage of the crisis, demanding that 
Polish banks repay foreign currency denominated loans. The Polish banks, which could not 
repay the loans in time (and had little access to the governmental aids, including the FPIK), 
were often taken over by foreigners. Dependency on foreign capital continued and became 
even more prominent after the crisis of 1925. As of 1930, the total contribution of foreign 
capital accounted for approximately one-third of the entire banking system’s capital. Polish 
private banks relied on funding from foreign investors; however, most of the funding was 
short- and medium-term as investors were worried about the fragility of an economy 
situated between Germany and the Soviet Union (Morawski 1996; Landau and Morawski 
1995).  
Consequently, following the crisis of 1925 and the capital injection by the FPIK, the banking 
industry structure had changed, notably, in two ways. First, state-owned banks grew 
significantly  while both the number and shares of private banks decreased due to 
governmental policies. Second, private banks became more dependent on government 
(state) capital and on foreign capital (Landau and Morawski 1995). The Ministry of Finance 
preferred to have fewer private banks. The government thought that along with state 
banks, several large private banks could thrive, attracting deposits and financing domestic 
and export trends; however, it was hard for private banks to compete with state banks, 
which benefitted from various governmental supports. Eventually, private banks gave up 
building long-term credit and focused more on short-term credit (Morawski 1996). 
However, the increased dependency on foreign capital had unintended ramifications 
during the Great Depression and the consequent banking crisis in 1930. The significant 
differences between the crisis of 1925 and the crisis of the 1930s was that Polish banks, to 
some extent, benefitted from the credit assistance from foreign banks in 1925. In contrast, 
in the 1930s, Polish banks faced a significant outflow of foreign capital as the international 





4 Refers to Polish statism.  
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Poland Context 1996 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
Data unavailable. 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
Data unavailable. 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt)  
Data unavailable. 
Size of banking system Data unavailable. 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
Data unavailable. 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data unavailable. 
Five-bank concentration of banking system Data unavailable. 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Prior to the independence, the 
financial sector was separately 
owned by Russian, Austrian, and 
Prussian banks. 
 
Government ownership of banking system Data unavailable. 
Existence of deposit insurance Data unavailable. 
Source: Morawski 1996,48 
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Key Design Decisions     
1. Part of a package: The FPIK package included direct aid to banks as well as 
government guarantees for foreign loans.  
The original FPIK package in 1925 also included guarantees for foreign loans (PLN 1.0 
million in 1925 and PLN 0.8 million in 1926), and the government could initiate the 
assistance in foreign currency, if necessary (Morawski 1996). 
The FPIK was established on November 28, 1925, to rescue troubled banks and prevent 
potential systemic risk in the Polish financial system.   
FPIK was terminated in May 1927, as the scheme was considered to have fulfilled its 
mandate (DURP 1927 nr. 46). However, as the credit market fluctuated during the Great 
Depression, the FPIK was reintroduced in 1931, and was incorporated into regulation in 
1932 (Morawski 1996; DURP 1931 nr. 36). The FPIK kept supporting the Polish financial 
system during the inter-war period.  
2. Legal authority: The FPIK was established by the Sanation Bill, which was passed 
on November 28, 1925. Though it was terminated in 1927, the scheme was 
reintroduced during the 1930s crisis and was incorporated as a regulation in 
1932.  
In September 1925, the Władysław Grabski government drafted the “Sanation Bill.” Some 
believed this bill to be based on the government’s experiences in operating the Bank 
Sanation Committee, which performed ad-hoc capital injections between September and 
October 1925. After Grabski retired in November, the new government led by Skrzyński 
took on and submitted the bill to Sejm (the lower house). The Sanation bill passed on 
November 28, 1925. The bill authorized the Minister of the Treasury to assist credit 
institutions through the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), an existing national 
development bank, and granted 65 million złoty to the newly established FPIK (Morawski 
1996). The Sanation Bill was part of “Sanacja” (Sanation), a political movement to address 
perceived corruption. The Sanation movement became particularly active after the May 
1926 coup d’états.  
The submitted bill, DURP 1925 nr. 119, Article 6.4 authorized the following features of the 
FPIK: 
• The sunset date of the FPIK: The end of 1927; 
• The eligibility for financial institutions: Credit institutions which displayed 
economic need; 
• The collateral conditions: The assistance was subject to appropriate collateral in 
the form of the (i) loans, (ii) guarantees, or (iii) “other financial operations that 
will prove necessary” in the liquidation of liabilities; 
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• The arrangements on the detailed terms of the loan (the interest rate, the 
method of calculating interest, the dates and manner of repayment of the 
principal, and others): To be determined by the Minister of the Finance; 
• The size of the program: PLN 65 million. 
Though the FPIK was terminated by the bill in May 1927, on March 17, 1931, a new law 
reinstated the program (DURP 1927 nr. 46; DURP 1931 nr. 36). The revived capital 
injection framework was mostly consistent with the original FPIK of 1925, but the size of 
the fund promised was significantly smaller. The new law in 1931 only authorized the FPIK 
to spend 20 million złoty for restoration of the financial system. Later critics have argued 
that the insufficient funds led to the failing of a few banks that had accepted assistance 
from the FPIK (Morawski 1996). In 1932, the FPIK, which had been implemented in the 
form of ad-hoc bills (with expiration dates), was finally incorporated into a regulation 
(DURP 1932 nr. 94; Morawski 1996). Reflecting the lessons the government had learnt 
from the past injections, the collateral condition was eased, including state guarantee, and 
the State Treasury (within a fixed quota of PLN 20 million) (DURP 1932 nr. 94). 
Furthermore, the regulation also newly assured more flexibilities to the Minister of the 
Finance, enabling receivable redemptions and any other changes in the design of the capital 
injection if deemed necessary.  
The regulation in 1932 did not have a specified sunset date. Morawski (1996) notes that 
capital injections undertaken on the basis of the 1932 regulation were much more effective 
than those under the ad-hoc 1931 bill. He also notes that the legal framework and the 
operation became more complex involving a multi-level combination of reliefs, allowances, 
guarantees, loans, and ownership changes. The regulation was amended in 1935 (DURP 
1935 nr. 85). 
3. Governance: The establishment of the FPIK, as well as the earlier Bank Sanation 
Committee, was initiated by the government, mostly by the Ministry of Finance. 
By contrast, the Bank Polski, the central bank, had little involvement despite its 
financial stability mandate. 
The establishment of the FPIK, as well as the Bank Sanation Committee, was initiated by the 
government, mostly by the Ministry of Finance. By contrast, the Bank Polski, the central 
bank, had little involvement despite its financial stability mandate. 
The Governance of the Bank Sanation Committee  
On September 21, 1925, the government established the Bank Sanation Committee under 
the leadership of the Deputy Minister of Treasury and a member of the BGK Council, Józef 
Karśnicki. The Committee was composed of two delegates of the Ministry of Treasury and 
one delegate from each of Bank Polski SA (the central bank), BGK, and Związek Banków w 
Polsce (ZBwP, the Polish Bank Association). Ad-hoc assistance was to be provided to 
eligible banks through BGK on the order of the Ministry of Treasury.   
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BGK was an existing government development bank which was established by a merger of 
three public Galician banks (Polski Bank, Krajowy Bank for Reconstruction, and Zakład 
Kredytowy Miejski Małopolskie) (Landau 1993). It grew significantly over the inter-war 
period by assisting governmental state-led economic policies (Mazur 2018).  
The Governance of the FPIK 
Similar to the Bank Sanation Committee, the creation of the FPIK was initiated by the 
government. The FPIK was operated through BGK as well (Morawski 1996).  
Notably, the FPIK’s capital injection was initiated by the government, not by the central 
bank, though the government originally argued that financial stability falls under the 
central bank’s mandate. Two government officials, Henryk Kaden and Zygmunt 
Chrzanowski, strongly protested against the BGK directing the aid to banks when drafting 
the bill for the FPIK. In their opinion, such aid should be provided by the central bank. 
However, the Bank Polski refused to take on the role, and maintaining financial stability 
eventually fell to the government (Morawski 1996). Morawski (1996) explains and 
criticizes the central bank for being reluctant to participate in financial stability policies as 
it prioritized defending the currency.  
4. Size: The first round of the FPIK in 1925 had PLN 65 million and 15 financial 
institutions had PLN 63.4 million capital injected. The second round of the FPIK 
in 1931 was much smaller in size: PLN 20 million.  
When the Sanation Bill was drafted in late September to October in 1925, the original 
intended size was 100 million złoty. However, when the bill was reviewed by the Sejm (the 
lower house), the amount was reduced to PLN 65 million (Morawski 1996). The FPIK 
injected PLN 63.34 million in capital in 15 financial institutions. In the second round in 
1931, the size of the FPIK was reduced to PLN 20 million.  
5. Timing: The bill that established the FPIK in 1925 expired in 1927, as the 
government determined that the capital injection scheme had fulfilled its goals. 
After FPIK’s revival in the 1930s, it was incorporated into regulation without a 
specific expiration date. While the bills or regulations did not determine the 
timing of capital injections, most financial institutions seem to have received 
assistance right after the bill in 1925 passed.  
On May 17, 1927, the FPIK was terminated as the President of the Republic of Poland 
determined that the financial crisis in 1925 was over and the FPIK had fulfilled its goals 
(Morawski 1996; DURP 1927 nr. 46). In 1932, the FPIK, which had been implemented in 
the form of ad-hoc bills (with expiration dates), was finally incorporated into a regulation 
(DURP 1932 nr. 945; Morawski 1996). The regulation in 1932 did not have a specified 
sunset date.  
578
Polish Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym Oguri
 
 
While the bills or regulations did not determine the timing of capital injections, most 
financial institutions seem to have received assistance right after the bill in 1925 passed. 
Although there were no specific legal requirements of constraints in the timing of the FPIK 
assistance, the capital was quickly injected. The swiftness was partially due to the 
government’s fear that if the FPIK did not intervene soon enough, foreign investors could 
take over private Polish banks. This concern materialized during the Great Depression; 
foreign shareholders in Polish banking grew as a result of taking over the share capital of 
credit institutions indebted to foreigners (Landau 2007). 
6. Source of funds: The government had a difficult time securing the funds for the 
injection and met the needs with seigniorage and foreign debts.  
Throughout the inter-war period, the government seems to have faced difficulty in securing 
the funding for the FPIK. Particularly, during the crisis in 1925 and the 1930s, the economy 
and the fiscal balance deteriorated significantly. For the Bank Sanation Committee 
established in September 1925, the government managed to grant PLN 25-28 million only 
from issuing new coins and raising the seigniorage (Morawski 1996). Landau (2007) 
suggests that part of the FPIK funding was also provided by the government’s foreign 
debts. 
According to Wierzbicki (n.d.), the long-term loans granted by BGK came from two sources. 
One was the BGK’s own funds, while the other was the state funds received by BGK, the 
purpose of which was precisely defined by the government. Article 7 of the Decree of the 
President of the Republic of Poland of May 30, 1924, also clearly stated that “funds 
allocated from the state budget for credit purposes, unless they are directly available to the 
state authorities, may only be administered by the Bank [BGK].” In practice, however, it 
was quite often the case that BGK did not receive funds from the state to finance certain 
tasks and thus granted the state an informal loan. The government’s repayment of this loan 
in the event of a budget deficit could vary. In the first months of its operation, BGK did not 
have sufficient funds to develop a long-term loan. The scale of this type of financing in the 
inter-war period is best illustrated by the figures. Between 1924 and 1938, BGK granted 
long-term loans amounting to nearly 2 billion zlotys. The majority of this sum came from 
deposits from the Ministry of Treasury and funds serviced by BGK from state special-
purpose funds, although the exact separation of these two sources also depended on the 
method of accounting in balance sheets. There were cases where long-term and issue loans 
were booked as coming from the bank’s own funds, despite the fact that these loans were 
partly realized through the purchase by the state of securities issued by BGK and 
government deposits. Thus, the majority of long-term loans granted by BGK between 1924 
and 1938 came from the bank’s own funds (PLN 1,095 million) and PLN 895 million from 
state resources. 
7. Eligible institutions: Larger banks were prioritized given the limit of fiscal space 
in the government.   
While the eligibility was only loosely defined in both 1925 and 1932 regulation on FPIK, 
not all financial institutions could participate in the FPIK (DURP 1925 nr. 119; DURP 1932 
nr. 94). The government was selective given the limit of the available funding. 
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Furthermore, the government intended to leverage the scheme to increase the efficiency 
in the credit market, by forcing smaller and weaker banks to exit.  
The first round of FPIK excluded small-credit institutions. This was due to two reasons. 
First, given the tight budget, the government lacked fiscal space to support all financial 
institutions. The government prioritized large banks over smaller ones. Second, the 
government hoped that the smaller and weaker financial institutions would exit from the 
credit market, given the over-competitive nature of the credit market (Landau 1993; 
Landau and Morawski 1995). The government did not intend to provide assistance to 
credit institutions that were not in the state’s interest, focusing on providing substantial 
assistance to institutions that were essential for servicing the national economy (Landau 
2007). Most smaller financial institutions were involved in various currency operations 
and were not much involved in lending or the credit market, and thus did not meet the 
interest of government support (Landau 1993). Figure 1 below shows the capital injection 
deployed by year and month, and Figure 2 below shows recipients of the capital injection.  
Figure 1. Aid installments by Bank Sanation Committee and the FPIK (first round in 
1925; as of December 31, 1926) 
  
Aid installments  

















Source: Morawski 1996. 
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Figure 2. Debtors of the FPIK (first round; as of December 31, 1926) 
Bank Name 
The Amount 
of the Debt 
(in min PLN) 
Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA 21.7 
Bank Ziemiański SA w Warszawie 8.5 
Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA we Lwowie 7.3 
Bank Małopolski SA w Krakowie 6.9 
Bank Przemysłowców SA w Poznaniu 6 
Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych SA w Poznaniu 5.2 
Ziemski Bank Kredytowy SA we Lwowie 3.3 
Polski Bank Komunalny SA w Warszawie 1 
Bank M. Stadthagen SA w Bydgoszczy 0.9 
Dom Bankowy T. Bunimowicz w Wilnie 0.7 
Wileński Prywatny Bank Handlowy SA w Wilnie 0.6 
Bank Przemysłowców Polskich SA w Warszawie 0.5 
Śląski Bank Przemysłowy SA w Bielsku* 0.5 
Bank Zjednoczonych Ziem Polskich SA w Warszawie 0.3 
Bank Handlowo-Przemysłowy SA w Łodzi 0.1** 
Total 63.4 
*During the merger with Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA in 
Lviv. 
**Debt fully repaid by the end of 1926. 
 
Source: Morawski 1996. 
The FPIK in 1931 and afterwards seemed to have had a similar criterion: prioritizing 
larger, significant private banks before the smaller ones. In 1931, the aid was granted to the 
following five banks: Polski Bank Przemysłowy SA in Warsaw, Bank M. Stadthagen SA in 
Bydgoszcz, Bank Ziemiański SA in Warsaw, Pomorskie Bank Rolnicze SA in Toruń, and 
Bank Ziemian SA in Poznań (Morawski 1996). Morawski (1996) also suggests that the 
government increased its efficiency in capital injections and officializations, learning 
lessons from the capital injections in 1920s.  
8. Repayment/debt restructuring plan: As well as the capital characteristics (e.g., 
interest rate), the Finance Minister was granted an autonomy in determining the 
details of repayment.  
As well as the capital characteristics (e.g., interest rate), the Finance Minister was granted 
autonomy in determining the details of repayment (DURP 1932 nr. 94). While not much 
information is available on the actual repayment by banks, according to Stelmach (2012), 
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financial institutions started paying back as early as June 1926 after the first FPIK 
assistance in 1925.  
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